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Introduction  
 
How do people, in particular youths with a history of delinquent behaviour, arrive at the 
decision to travel to foreign places in order to fight in a war in the name of Islam? This has 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Rudie J.M. Neve, Email: rudie.neve@politie.nl, PO Box 100, 3970 AC 
Driebergen, The Netherlands. 
Abstract 
Although many studies have investigated the backgrounds of people who went to Syria to 
join jihadist groups, much remains unclear about the underlying radicalisation processes. 
Many authors have noted that radicalisation and terrorism are associated with involvement 
in crime (the crime-terror nexus), in particular with membership of delinquent groups. 
However, it is unclear how this relation can be explained. This study was designed to 
increase insight into how the actual radicalisation process took place in one specific youth 
network in the Netherlands with a high prevalence of crime, and what triggered young 
people from this network to get involved in travelling to Syria. Based on police records, 
documents and interviews, we conducted a case study in a Dutch city in which twenty 
people went to Syria to join jihadist groups in early 2013. Most of them were involved in a 
troublesome youth group in a deprived multi-ethnic neighbourhood. We trace how a 
subgroup of this youth group radicalised, and how they made a connection with the jihadist 
network in the larger region. The results suggest that not only experiences of deprivation 
contributed to the radicalisation process but also the presence of persons with earlier ties to 
the jihadist network, as well as trigger events that led to existential questions and elevated 
susceptibility. Marriages with radical young women involved in the sister network also 
seem to have contributed to an overlap between this local youth group and a wider jihadist 
network. Furthermore, relatively criminal members gained status in the youth group by 
getting involved in jihadism. The results suggest that maintaining contact with youths at 
risk of radicalisation should be central to local prevention efforts. Radicalisation through 
trigger events and recruitment by jihadist propagandists could be prevented with 
specifically targeted interventions. 
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become a pressing question since the civil war in Syria led to relatively large numbers of 
young people from Western Europe heading out to the conflict area to join jihadist groups. 
Travelling to Syria has been labelled the ‘fourth wave’ of jihadist travelling (Coolsaet, 2016), 
following three earlier waves (Sageman, 2008). The few participants of the first wave were 
inspired by the mujahedin fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the second wave has 
been characterised as ‘elite’, such as the perpetrators of 9/11, who were mostly well-educated 
immigrants from the Middle-East. The travellers forming the third wave (following the 2003 
Iraq war) and especially the fourth wave after the start of the civil war in Syria (2012) often 
included young people from deprived neighbourhoods, many of whom had previous criminal 
experience (Gallagher, 2016). A criminal background as an antecedent of radicalisation 
became referred to as ‘the new crime-terror nexus’ (Basra et al., 2016). This stands in contrast 
to a previous conception of the crime-terror nexus as cooperation between criminal and 
terrorist organisations or terrorist organisations committing crimes in order to finance their 
activities.2  
Based on the profiles of seventy-nine jihadists, Basra et al. (2016) showed that the 
ISIS version of the jihadist narrative is well-suited to the needs and desires of young 
criminals. It can be used to curtail as well as to legitimise criminality. For some, it offers 
redemption, while it also satisfies the personal needs that led them to commit crimes 
previously. Basra and colleagues note: ‘Just like the criminal gangs of which they used to be 
members, jihadist groups offered power, violence, adventure and adrenaline, a strong identity, 
and – not least – a sense of rebellion and being anti-establishment’ (Basra et al., p. 24). The 
authors did not find any evidence that terrorist organisations actually try to recruit among 
criminal groups or gangs.3 Thus, the new crime-terror nexus is not a matter of cooperation 
between organisations, but is a consequence of criminals and jihadists sharing the same 
backgrounds and networks.  
 
2 A brief overview is given in Ljujic, Van Prooijen & Weerman (2017).  
3 However, according to Lakhani (2018) extremists try to recruit criminals and encourage them to continue their 
criminality by offering religious and social justifications to reduce moral concerns. The crime-terror nexus ‘…. is 
about reconstructing criminals’ motivations’ (p. 2). 
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Empirical studies have also shown similarities between youth gangs and terrorist 
groups. Both have a weak group structure combined with strong bonds between members, and 
there are similarities in demographic composition, marginalised membership and the role of 
detention in the growth of the group. Both types of groups offer adventure and excitement, a 
feeling of power, control and identity (Decker & Pyrooz, 2015; Pyrooz, LaFree, Decker & 
James, 2018; Valasik & Philips, 2017). Because of these similarities, some authors speculated 
that overlap between gangs and extremist groups would emerge, both in terms of actual 
alliances and cooperation, as in terms of common background characteristics.  
Pyrooz and colleagues (2018) were the first to study empirically whether this overlap 
existed or not. They distinguished three theoretical models in the literature about the potential 
overlap between gangs and terrorist networks. First, in the independence model, no overlap is 
expected and the causes of involvement in gangs vs. terrorist groups are assumed to be 
different. Second, the interchangeability model expects that the causes as well as group 
membership overlap strongly and that members of both groups come from the same 
population. Third, the fundamental cause model predicts little overlap between groups with 
respect to membership, while the causes and backgrounds of group membership are 
comparable. In their study, Pyrooz et al. (2018) found that six percent of a sample of 1473 
domestic extremists had gang ties in the past, which is a small number in the context of 
850,000 estimated gang members in the US. Therefore, they conclude that the independence 
model fits their data best, although the existence of common backgrounds (relatively more 
poverty and unemployment) point to the fundamental cause model as well (Pyrooz et al., 
2018).  
Although Pyrooz and colleagues took a first step in investigating the links between 
gangs and involvement in terrorist networks, they did not have access to detailed data on the 
routes to and content of involvement with extremism in their study. More generally, it is still 
largely unknown through which processes delinquent youths get radicalised and how they 
become involved in traveling to foreign regions to join a jihadist group. Much of the existing 
research on this issue is based on open registers or case studies derived from court records or 
  
 
 
 
 
Neve, Weerman, Eris & van Prooijen: Radicalisation and travelling to Syria among 
delinquent youths 
 
 
 
 
252 
Spring 2020 
Nr. 22 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
media reports, and information about the individual pathways leading to radicalisation is often 
absent or limited.  
In contrast, a large body of literature exist about terrorism and foreign fighting in 
general. Becoming involved in a terrorist network has been described as ‘…a complex 
process of accommodation and assimilation across incrementally experienced stages…’ 
(Horgan, 2008, p. 92). Only a small minority of those who adhere to violent jihad on social 
media actually join a jihadist group (Van San, 2015a). The vast empirical literature identifies 
several risk factors, such as demographics, social economic status, personality, and perceived 
discrimination and group threats (Feddes, Nickolson & Doosje, 2015; Bergema & Van San, 
2017; Ljujic, Van Prooijen & Weerman, 2017; Paulussen, Nijman & Lismont, 2017; 
Schulten, Doosje, Spaaij & Kamphuis, 2019; Thijs, Rodermond & Weerman, 2018; Van den 
Bos, 2018; Versteegt, Ljujic, El Bouk, Weerman & Van Maanen, 2018; Weenink, 2015, 
2019; Wolfowicz et al., 2019).4 These risk factors may lead to radicalisation into jihadism 
when certain situational factors are present as well5. For instance, contacts with radicalized 
others are an important situational risk factor as well as the presence of ‘radicalisation hubs’, 
such as the presence of militant Salafist networks or radical mosques (Vidino, Marone & 
Entenmann, 2017). We also know from the literature that radicalisation and involvement is 
often a stepwise process in which various ‘trigger events’ can play a role (Doosje et al., 2016; 
Moghaddam, 2005; Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, 2014). However, it remains unclear through 
which pathways these risk factors and ‘trigger events’ have lead delinquent youths to become 
involved in travelling to Syria, and why there is such a close resemblance in the 
characteristics of gangs and jihadist groups.  
  
 
 
4 A brief international overview of risk factors is provided by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (Ranstorp, 
2016).  
5 Agnew (2006) proposed the concept ‘storyline’ in order to overcome the temporal distance between relatively 
‘stable’ risk factors, and situational factors occuring at a particular moment. A similar aproach is the ‘criminal 
event’ perspective, which analyses the particular environmental and behavioural contexts leading to a criminal 
event (Sacco & Kennedy, 2002).  
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Current Study 
This study aims to delve deeper into the crime-terror nexus through a retrospective 
analysis of the backgrounds and radicalisation history of twenty young people who travelled 
to Syria to join jihadist groups. They came from a deprived neighbourhood in a mid-sized city 
in the Netherlands, and most of them had been involved in a local ‘troublesome youth group’. 
We used police records, documents and interviews with local professionals to reconstruct the 
events and processes that led to the radicalisation of part of the group, to their connection with 
the jihadist network and to their efforts to travel to Syria. 
We expanded the models of Pyrooz and colleagues, and distinguished six possible 
scenarios for a link between troublesome youth groups and radicalisation: 
1. Specific personal and environmental characteristics enhance radicalisation at the 
individual level, during or after membership of a youth group 
2. The youth group or part of it radicalise together, eventually transforming the group or 
subgroup into a jihadist network or a subgroup within one. 
3. Individuals or subgroups within the youth group radicalise, and merge with the jihadist 
network 
4. Individuals radicalise after quitting the group and continue to use the skills and 
networks acquired in the group 
5. Radicalised young people or returnees form a new troublesome youth group 
6. Common factors account for membership of a troublesome youth group as well as for 
radicalisation, and membership of delinquent and terrorist groups overlaps.  
 
Our analysis enabled us to identify risk factors, trigger events and processes 
underlying radicalisation within this youth group and underlying the travelling to Syria by 
some of its members. Based on the results, we discuss which of the six scenarios are most 
applicable for the Netherlands. 
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Research Method 
 
For the central case study, we performed semi-structured interviews with eleven professionals 
working in the neighbourhood in which the youth group was active and who had direct 
knowledge of the history of this group or its members. These included four community police 
officers, a police analyst, a member of the National Crime Squad, two social workers, one 
secondary school teacher and one municipal employee. Most interviewees were suggested by 
the leadership of the local police and by the municipality department of Public Order and 
Security, who were asked by researchers to mention the professionals most directly involved 
with the youth group. For the social workers, management permission for the interview was 
obtained. The interviewees were approached directly by a researcher, referring to the 
permission of their local management and the Minister. A few were found through the police 
information system, where they appeared as authors of relevant registrations. Personal data 
were shared only in interviews with police officers held by the first author. All interviews 
with police officers are subject to the WPG. 
Informed consent was obtained for all interviews. Interviewees were informed about 
the purpose of the study and the confidential and anonymous processing of the results. Those 
who were interviewed by the first author (also working within the police organization) were 
contacted by e-mail containing all relevant information about the study before agreeing to 
take part in the interview. Others who spoke with NSCR-interviewers were informed during 
the interview and signed an informed consent form. Interviews lasted between one and two 
hours and were recorded with the permission of the interviewee (except one refusal). Reports 
(not verbatim) of between four and eight pages were sent to the interviewees to check for 
errors and misunderstandings, which led to a few changes.  
To put the findings from our case study in perspective, we also held an inventory to 
find indications of radicalisation in other troublesome youth groups known to the Dutch 
authorities. This inventory was based on a national police registration system of ‘troublesome 
youth groups’, associated with nuisance and crime, with data at the group and individual 
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level6. We had access to data from 2017, which contained information about 4691 individuals 
connected to 479 youth groups. Older data were not available, as retention of these police 
data, often on minors, is tightly restricted.  
Data from the registration system of troublesome youth groups were linked to a police 
database on signs of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism at the individual level. Groups 
with hits were further scrutinised, which resulted in selection of groups for which substantial 
evidence exist that group members became radicalised. The process of selecting the groups 
for further scrutiny was performed entirely within the police context, under the conditions of 
the Ministerial approval for the study. No results were returned into the police registration 
systems that were used, and these remained unchanged.  
For the groups with substantial signs of radicalisation, we also conducted exploratory 
case studies that were less extensive than the case study for the main group under 
investigation. In these smaller case studies, we held two to five interviews per group, with the 
same conditions as in the core case study. Next to this, we also studied two comparison 
groups with no signs of radicalisation. These groups were matched to the core case study 
group with respect to neighbourhood characteristics as well as criminal records of their 
members. 
  In our interviews and analyses, we looked at environmental characteristics, such as the 
neighbourhoods in which the group operated, as well as circumstances, events and people that 
may have played a role in the development of the youth groups and in the radicalisation of 
their members. At the group level, we gathered information on demographic composition and 
structure of the group, and how the radicalisation process had taken place within the context 
of the group. We also tried to collect information about the extent to which radicalisation took 
place in the group, in subgroups or in specific individuals. The roles that different individuals 
from within and outside the group played in the process was scrutinised and we asked about 
the religious or ideological content of the interactions. On the individual level we gathered 
 
6 The registration system distinguishes three types of troublesome youth groups: ‘hinderlijk’ (annoying), 
‘overlastgevend’ (causing nuisance) and ‘crimineel’ (criminal).    
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background information on educational level, income, work status and family composition, 
psychosocial problems, and criminal careers, as far as this was available in the police 
information that we could use. 
 
Results 
 
The central case study was based on events that had received much attention in the Dutch 
media and the political arena. In early 2013, twenty people from one neighbourhood in a mid-
sized city in the Netherlands went to Syria, where ISIS was gaining importance and later on, 
in 2014, proclaimed the ‘caliphate’. In this results section, we first present background 
information on the structural and group level. Then we go into the details on the individual 
travellers and the timeline of their radicalisation and travelling to Syria.  
 
The local context 
The neighbourhood (which we call N1 after the pseudonym Neighbourhood 1) in 
which the youth group operated, consists of nearly 3000 households, of which 40% live in 
apartments built in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the houses are owned by public housing 
associations or the municipality. The socio-economic status of the inhabitants is mostly low. 
Over 40% of the inhabitants have a migrant background, with the largest groups having roots 
in Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Turkey, as well as the former Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. 
The presence of a large asylum seekers facility nearby accounts in part for the relatively high 
presence in N1 of ‘status holders’, people who have been granted asylum. According to a 
2017 report, governmental budget cuts have reduced facilities that already were scarce, such 
as meeting places for the youth. The open spaces of the built environment, such as freely 
accessible flat galleries, lead to low levels of social control. Criminality is high in N1 and the 
inhabitants feel unsafe, especially in the evenings. There are many social problems in N1: 
debts, psychological and parenting problems (especially among the large number of single 
parent families), addictions and social isolation. Tensions between different ethnic groups 
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occur in the public spaces of N1 (Uyterlinden & Van der Velden, 2017). Relatively many 
young people in the neighbourhood leave school without qualifications that would enable 
them to enter the labour market. Especially the older youths have bleak future prospects and 
experience discrimination. A large part of the youths spend most of their time on the streets. 
In short, general risk or susceptibility factors for radicalisation known from the literature, such 
as unemployment, lack of perspective, and personal and psychological problems, abound in 
N1.  
A local youth centre was the central point in the life of many young people in the 
neighbourhood with a migration background. A period of turmoil started when it was 
discovered in 2009 that criminal activities were being plotted inside the youth centre. The 
municipality tried to intervene by implementing a pass system in order to prevent older people 
and youth from outside N1 from attending the youth centre. However, the result of this 
intervention was that also many younger visitors joined the growing street scene outside the 
youth centre. Social workers, the municipality as well as police officers lost contact with the 
young people on the streets. Crime escalated (in the words of officials involved at the time), 
but the development of new crime prevention measures was slow due to a lack of cooperation 
between agencies. Repressive actions by the police led to further loss of trust among the 
young people, decreased contact with them, and it strengthened feelings of not being part of 
society.7  
 
History and background of the youth group 
The youth group has a history going back to the early 2000s, according to official 
sources and accounts of municipality and police personnel. Large families living in small 
flats, as well as the low accessibility of the youth centre, led many young people to spend a 
large amount of time on the street. The ethnic composition of the group is diverse, although a 
majority had parents with origins in Muslim countries, especially Morocco. Others have 
 
7 A new approach was developed after 2014 when part of the local youth group had departed to Syria. 
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Turkish, Afghan, Iraqi, and Caribbean backgrounds. Many youths from the group dropped out 
of school and are unemployed.  
Although the term ‘group’ suggests cohesion, the troublesome youth group was sooner 
a fluid network, without clear leadership and membership boundaries. Because of this, it is 
difficult to determine membership and group size. In 2014, the group size was estimated at 
160 in a police analysis report aimed at prioritising interventions with respect to growing 
criminality in the years 2013 and 2014. Small subgroups with varying membership were 
involved in burglaries or mugging, whereas other subgroups were mainly known for nuisance. 
Although the group was fluid in its membership, it was clearly visible and recognisable on the 
streets. Police officers and social workers had difficulty staying in contact with group 
members because of the large group size and because all community police officers were 
white while most young people in the group had a migrant background. 
  Within the group, loyalty towards each other was an important value. Apart from the 
common Muslim background, respondents connected to each other by their multiple 
experiences of discrimination. When going out at the weekend, they were regularly refused 
admission to bars, and it was difficult to find a job or even an internship. The idea that they 
were not allowed to be part of society prompted an uncommunicative attitude towards 
professionals. 
Because crimes such as violence, burglaries and mugging have had the most emphasis 
in the activities of professionals as well as the police registration of members of the group, 
little is known about the role of girls. Police analysts acknowledged this in a 2014 internal 
report, and called it a blind spot in their knowledge about the youth network.  
Acquiring status, street credibility, a tough image, and possession of money and 
luxury goods were all considered important within the group. As shown in video recordings 
made within the group, daring behaviours such as 'pulling wheelies’ with a scooter were 
highly valued. Having served time in prison increased street credibility as well. When young 
perpetrators received community service as a penalty, they enhanced their status in the group 
by avoiding most of the work (or pretending to). As will be discussed later, respondents also 
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believe that knowledge of the salafi-jihadist ideology and connection with the jihadist 
network in the larger region was considered as an asset in the street culture of the group, 
which possibly made it easier to convince fellow group members to join.  
Another aspect of street culture that was important for the group was the emergence 
during the early 2000s of rap crews and rap culture. These emerged in the neighbourhood, as 
well as in several other multi-ethnic neighbourhoods in the Netherlands (De Jong, 2010; 
Kooymans, 2017). Rap videos on the internet that are related to the group date back to 2007.8 
Lyrics expressed how the young people deal with their deprived position in society and with 
bad situations at home, such as ‘… mama is broke, so for the time being I‘ll be pushing 
drugs’. Apart from the performance, videos include impression management behaviour, such 
as wearing balaclavas to highlight the delinquent nature of the street culture. Discrimination is 
mentioned often, as well as rejection of the dominant white culture. In later video recordings, 
lyrics referred to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Syria, where at that time 
members of the group were present. As is common in rap lyrics, they exaggerated the extent 
of the problems, as in ‘half the hood is locked up, the other half fights Assad’.  
 
Travelling to Syria in early 2013 
Table 1 gives an overview of travellers to Syria in the first three months of 2013 (the 
names are pseudonyms). It contains information on 20 people who travelled to Syria, ordered 
chronologically with regard to the time of departure (the lowest three rows provide 
information on people who have been instrumental in the travelling of others). The columns 
show information on gender and age, status in 2019 (presumed dead, returned or remains in 
the Middle East), criminal records before 2013, and criminal records after return, for those 
who returned. The criminal records were categorised as none, ‘low’, which indicates older 
and minor offenses, such as shoplifting as a teenager, and ‘serious’, indicating recent and 
more serious offenses, such as burglary.  
 
8 See, for example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWeu3Cg3ucg 
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Table 1. Overview of Syria travellers from N1 
Pseudo-
nym* 
Origin 
Parent** 
Gender
/Age 
2013 
 
Depart 
2013 
Status/ 
Month of 
return 
Crime 
Record end 
2012*** 
Crime  
Record 
2013-2018*** 
Mohamad 
A 
Moroccan M23 Jan Presumed 
dead 
Low - 
Ahmed A Moroccan M21 Jan Presumed 
dead 
Low - 
Hassan B Moroccan M26 Jan Presumed 
dead 
Low - 
Sahir B Moroccan M20 Jan Presumed 
dead 
Serious - 
Khalid Moroccan M29 Jan Aug 13 No Serious 
Terek Turkish/K
urdish 
M24 Feb Syria Serious - 
Abdul Turkish 
/Kurdish 
M24 Feb Syria No - 
Rashid Iraqi M25 Feb Jun 13 Low No 
Ali Iraqi M24 Feb Presumed 
dead 
Serious - 
Mario Europe M22 Feb Presumed 
dead 
Low - 
Hidaya  
(x Mario) 
Moroccan F21 Feb Syria No - 
Hamza Somali M20 Feb Aug 13 Serious Serious 
Mateo Caribean M19 Feb Aug 13 Serious Serious 
Björn Europe M18 Feb May 13 No No 
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Adam Moroccan M22 Feb Jul 13 Serious Serious 
Kaoutar 
(x Björn) 
Caribean F20 Mrt Attempt No No 
Adel C Moroccan M25 Mar Presumed 
dead 
Low - 
Anwar C Moroccan M24 Mar Presumed 
dead  
Low - 
Salman C Moroccan M19 Mar Syria  No - 
Samira C Moroccan F22 Mar Syria No - 
Fadwa C Moroccan F43 Mar Syria No - 
Kamal Arab M24 Fac Facilitator Low No 
Sanjar Turkish M28 Fac Facilitator No No 
Yusuf Arab M53 Fac Facilitator Serious 
(old) 
No 
* Letter A, B, C indicate a family relationship, x indicates an Islamic marriage. 
** Based on country of birth of parents and info from interviews. 
*** Categories are no, low (old and lighter antecedents) and serious (recent and serious 
offenses , such a burglary, assault).  
 
Most of the travellers had a Moroccan background, and all except the converts Mario, 
Mateo, Björn and Kaoutar originate from Muslim cultures. Mario is not from N1 but did 
marry a local woman and is included because of his important role in the group (as will be 
explained later).  
A preliminary but important observation is that only a small part of the youth group 
was involved in travelling, as the group as a whole was estimated to be about 160 people at 
the time. All males in the table were involved in the troublesome youth group, except Mario, 
Björn and Khalid. The latter became involved in serious crime with Hamza and Mateo after 
their return. Only Terek, Hamza and Mateo were considered ‘priority subjects’ by local 
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police, whereas 60% of the entire youth group had this label. Thus, most of the travellers were 
not regarded as particularly criminal members of the group.  
Roughly three small ‘waves’ of Syria travelling from N1 have been identified in the 
interviews. A brief overview is given before we discuss a timeline of the events preceding the 
travels.  
The first travellers, in January, had a relatively strong religious and ideological 
motivation. Most of them belonged to a group of six around the brothers Mohamad and 
Ahmed, who held meetings the year before. Three of them died within months, and Sahir died 
in 2015, reportedly.  
The February travellers were more mixed in background. Those with criminal records 
soon returned and some of them immediately resumed their criminal careers. It was a great 
surprise that these highly active criminal youths, who were not involved in the group around 
Ahmed and Mohamad, went to Syria. Converts Björn and Mario left in February too, and both 
their wives followed a little later. Kaoutar’s attempt failed, however. 
The March travellers were all members of a Moroccan family (three young men, their 
sister and their mother) except the father, who drove them to the airport ‘for a holiday’. The 
males were involved in the youth group but had minor criminal records. Shortly before 
departure, they stole money from the account of a student association at the college9 of which 
two of them were on the board. These people were not active in the early radical group. Two 
of the men died, the other brother is in a Kurdish camp (November 2019), the sister currently 
lives in Turkey, and the mother’s fate is unknown. 
 
Timeline of the radicalisation process 
Table 2 shows summaries of timelines that were made for the group in general and for 
selected individuals that we consider having exemplary pathways toward travelling to Syria 
within the youth group of N1. 
 
9 Hogeschool or University of Applied Sciences, the highest level of education after the general universities. 
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In the first row, the general timeline for the neighbourhood and group as a whole 
covers a few crucial events and developments. These include the activities (mentioned in all 
interviews) of an older former criminal who turned Salafist (we call him Yusuf). His earliest 
religious activity was an attempt to find a location to organise Quran lessons for children in 
2004. He is reportedly involved, possibly financially, in the Umrah10 of a group of young 
people from N1 in 2009. He was prominently present at a jihadist demonstration in 
Amsterdam in 2012, with Mario and Hassan. Another development was that the street culture 
in the group grew strongly, in particular after restrictions on access to the youth centre were 
imposed.  
An important event in 2010 was a failed assault on a supermarket, where the owners 
defended themselves fiercely, leading to the death of a young offender who fell down a 
staircase. He was a member of the youth group and this event raised profound questions about 
life, death and religion among friends of the deceased group member such as Mohamad and 
Ahmed. These existential questions were not answered satisfactorily by the local mosque nor 
by other agencies.  
 
10 Umrah is the ‘small pilgrimage’ to Mecca, relative to the Hadj.  
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Table 2 Timelines of the N1 group in general and selected Syria travellers 
Pseudonym Before 2010 2010-2011 2012 2013 2014-2015 After 2015 
N1/ Group - Crackdown on youth 
crime  
- Growing street 
culture  
- Rap crew since 2007 
- Older Salafist Yusuf, 
former criminal, active 
in N1 since 2004 
- 2009: Umrah from 
group  
- End 2010: group 
member dies in failed 
assault  
- Several persons take 
part in jihadist 
demonstration 
Amsterdam 
- Group members 
involved in religion as 
well as in crime 
- Social workers note 
Syria resonates   
- 20 persons 
travel to Syria, all 
involved in youth 
group except 2 
converts and 3 
women. 9 die, 6 
return, 5 remain.  
Two more 
women 
prevented. 
- Incidental 
contacts with 
travellers by 
youth and family, 
some inform the 
police 
 
- Street culture 
and size of youth 
group diminish 
- Signs of new 
generation of 
radicalised youth 
- Several 
members visit SA 
for religion 
Mario 
 
- Lives in nearby town 
- Convert since 2003, 
devotes life to Islam, 
explores 
fundamentalist 
preachers 
- Marries strict 
Muslim girl from N1 
- Involved in growing 
S4B 
- In jihadi 
demonstration in 
Amsterdam with 
Yusuf and fellow 
traveller Hassan 
- Active in connecting 
jihadist network in the 
region 
- Is acquainted to 
Ahmed and others 
- Board member of 
Salafist foundation 
with Björn 
 
- Travels to Syria 
and joins Jabath 
al Nusra, later 
ISIS, starts 
successful career.  
- Soon followed 
by his pregnant 
wife  
 
 
 
 
- Burns passport 
in video 
 
 
- Dies in defence 
of Baghouz 
- Wife and kids in 
Kurdish camp  
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Ahmed 
 
Minor offences 
Turns to Islam after 
dead father in 2009 
- Leads radical group 
with his brother 
- cultivate image of 
Islam connoisseur  
- guards jihadi demo’s  
e.g. prevents 
journalists talking to 
women 
- marries African 
convert girl he knows 
thru Björn 
- Radical group around 
Ahmed merges into 
jihadi network in 
larger region.  
- Visits meetings of 
jihadist preacher who 
goes to Syria too 
 
- Leaves first with 
his brother. Both 
die within 
months.  
- Most of the 
radical group 
follow soon 
- Involved in 
Assad soldiers’ 
massacre, says 
obituary 
- Child is born. 
Widow at home 
behind his choice 
   
- Widow marries 
another jihadist 
and has a second 
child with him 
 
Terek - Commits property 
crimes 
- Is suspect in a home 
assault with two 
others; acquitted in 
appeal 
- Receive large 
amount of money from 
prosecution office 
- Had psychological 
problems says family 
- Involved in ‘group 
Ahmed’ and visits 
jihadi preacher who 
went to Syria too 
- Also involved in 
crime 
- Travels to Syria 
with other 
Kurdish young 
man from N1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Meets mother in 
border town, 
where he arrives 
from the front 
- Joins ISIS 
- Marries young 
Syrian girl 
- Remains in ME 
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Rashid - Commits minor 
crimes 
- Violence 2008 
 
 
 
 
- Gives up crime and 
is interested in 
religion 
- Involved in group 
Ahmed 
Travels to Syria 
and returns  
- Involved in 
Salafist network 
- Unemployed, 
depressed 
- Marries woman 
from another part 
of the country 
who was stopped 
in Turkey in 2015 
- Involved in 
Salafist network 
- Arrested in 
jihadi case, 
released for 
minor role 
Hamza 
 
- Involved in rap scene 
- Crimes since 2007, 
age 14 
- Ambitious criminal - Commits crimes  
- Last months 
interested in religion 
 
 
- Travels to Syria 
with Caribbean 
friend. Both 
return in August 
and resume crime 
career 
- Photo shows the 
friends with 
AK47s 
- Involved in 
serious property 
crime and fraud 
- Prison term 
- Great status on 
street 
- Leads group of 
10 from N1 in 
pilgrimage to SA 
2019 
- Remains active 
in property crime 
and fraud 
- Performs as 
musician 
Björn - Converts to Islam 
when meeting Muslim 
friends in youth care 
centre 
- Not involved in crime 
- Marries strict 
Muslim girl and they 
have a child  
- Goes on pilgrimage 
- Board member of 
Salafist foundation 
with Mario 
- Travels to Syria 
and comes back 
in three months 
- Wife is 
prevented from 
travel 
- Does prison 
time and tries to 
take op life 
 
- Tries to find job 
and live a Salafist 
life. 
- Wife active in 
‘sister network’ 
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In 2012, the year before departure of twenty people from N1 to Syria, several 
members of the youth group were involved in a radicalised subgroup (taking part in a national 
jihadist demonstration) as well as in crime. Social workers noted that the call to defend the 
Muslims in the Middle East resonated among these young men. The police were informed by 
mosque board members that the radical group was causing trouble, and were trying to include 
other believers in their activities. The police had no answer, however, mostly because of a 
lack of knowledge about the phenomenon of radicalisation, at that time a relatively new 
phenomenon to the police officers, although a former wave of radicalisation was not long ago 
at the time (AIVD, 2009).  
In 2014 and 2015 the returnees among the travellers developed in different directions: 
some resumed their criminal careers, others tried to live a truly Salafist pious life, and some 
tried to do both at the same time or switch between them. Those surviving in Syria 
occasionally had contact with home.  
Mario was a convert of European origin who lives in a nearby town. He converted to 
Islam when he had a Muslim girlfriend as a teenager, whom he soon married. He made 
Muslim friends and increasingly devoted his life to his new religion. Soon he became much 
stricter than his friends and his girlfriend and the relationship ended. He visited several 
preachers and became involved in Sharia 4 Belgium, a group inspired by the UK based Al 
Muhajiroun movement, also known as Islam 4 UK. This group played a crucial role in the 
development of the jihadist movement in the region and in the Netherlands. Mario and 
another radicalised person played an important role in building a stable network among the 
jihadists, including a radical group around Ahmed and his brother.11 With Björn, he was a 
board member of a foundation that played a role in recruitment (dissolved after the departure 
to Syria). In 2010, Mario married a strict Muslim girl from N1, Hidaya. She was already 
radicalised when she met Mario and was active in the sister network of jihadi Salafist women 
of which few people were aware at the time. In 2010, Mario also became acquainted with 
 
11 The development of this network has also been described in Bakker & Grol (2016).  
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Ahmed and his friends. He was also closely befriended with a jihadist preacher who later 
travelled to Syria. Mario left in February 2013, somewhat later than Ahmed and his group. 
His pregnant wife Hidaya followed soon afterwards. Mario had a career in Jabath el Nusra 
and ISIS before he was reportedly killed in Bagousz, the last territory of ISIS that fell in 2019. 
He became notorious for burning his Dutch passport in a video in 2014, declaring that he was 
happy to have nothing more to do with the country.  
Ahmed was the younger of two brothers who had a leading role in the radicalising 
group. Both were enrolled in higher education at the time. After the death of their father, the 
brothers turned to radical religion. When a friend from the youth group died in the failed 
robbery mentioned above, the group around Ahmed developed in an even more radical 
direction and joined the group led by the jihadist preacher with Mario. Before that, they 
caused trouble in several local mosques, but the police had little idea how to respond. Ahmed 
acted as a security guard at jihadist demonstrations, such as one against the niqab ban in 2011. 
In 2011, he married an African convert girl he knew through Björns wife. Ahmed became a 
father just before he left for Syria with his brother and his friends in the early days of 2013. 
Both brothers died within a few months and obituaries appeared online, one of which was 
written by Hassan. Ahmed’s widow, who stayed at home, later married another important 
jihadi.  
Terek was a Turkish/Kurdish young man who was among the more criminal group 
members, committing property crimes until he left for Syria in February 2013. One of his first 
arrests was for stealing a car at the age of 16. In 2012 he was acquitted on appeal for a home 
robbery and received some tens of thousands of euros from the public prosecution service as 
compensation for unjust detention. According to his family, interviewed after his departure, 
he spent the money quickly. Later, he had psychological problems. He and a Kurdish friend 
joined the radical religious group around Ahmed, but remained criminally active as well. The 
two friends travelled to Syria in mid-January. Occasionally, Terek had contacts with home 
and he met his mother near the Turkish border. He joined ISIS in 2014 and married a young 
Syrian girl, with whom he reportedly has children and lives in Turkey.  
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Rachid has an Iraqi background and was involved in petty crime before 2010, when he 
became interested in Islam and had no further police contacts related to crime. In 2012, he 
became involved in the group around Ahmed, Terek and others, who were also acquainted to 
Mario. In February he travelled to Syria with another young Iraqi man. He returned in the 
summer and seemed to have problems adapting in N1. He unsuccessfully looked for a job, 
and seemed depressed at times. He is still involved in the Salafist network and has been seen 
with relevant people on several occasions across the country. In 2015 he married a woman 
from another part of the country, who had been prevented from travelling to Syria and is 
active in the sister network. In 2017 he was arrested in a terrorism investigation, but soon 
released because of his marginal role.  
Hamza has an East-African background and was arrested for the first time in 2007 at 
the age of 14. Many arrests followed. Later he became active in a local rap crew. He was also 
still active as a criminal. When he left for Syria in January 2013 with Mateo, everyone in N1 
was very surprised. However, his family reported that he had been more religious for some 
months before departure and that he liked to wear a djellaba, which he had never done before. 
He returned from Syria in August and resumed his criminal career. He has been convicted for 
arms trafficking and an attempted robbery. Although a conversation was intercepted in which 
financial support for ‘the brothers’ was mentioned, a terrorist motive was rejected in court. He 
is still involved in crime; he performs and records as a musician and in 2019 led a group of 
about ten in a pilgrimage trip to Saudi Arabia as well. 
Björn became acquainted with young Muslims when he lived in a youth care facility 
after the divorce of his parents, and soon converted to Islam. Earlier, he had been interested in 
the Christian religion. He had never been involved in crime. He lived in N1 and there he 
married a strict Muslim girl who was affiliated to the jihadist sister network, just like Mario’s 
wife. He visited radical mosques and preachers and was a board member of the foundation 
with Mario. He went to Syria for three months and after coming back spent some time in 
prison. Since then, he has lived a Salafist life and is trying to find a job. His Caribbean wife 
remains active in the sister network.  
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The next section further elaborates crucial elements of the radicalisation process that 
came to the fore in the timelines of the group and the individual members.  
 
Connecting with the jihadist network 
Although everyone in N1, including social workers and police, was taken completely 
by surprise when a number of young people left for Syria in early 2013, it later emerged that 
the radicalisation process had already been going on for some years. Several young people 
connected to the troublesome youth group became more involved in the Islamic religion from 
2009 onwards. Apart from the Internet, which since 2010 facilitated orientation on radical 
Islam, personal contacts seem to have played an important role in this. Some members of the 
group became acquainted with people involved in the jihadist network in the wider area.  
When people from N1 left for Syria in 2013, little attention was paid to the role of 
women in the jihadist movement.12 More recently, the AIVD (Dutch Intelligence and Security 
Service) has described how women do play an important role in connecting and consolidating 
the jihadist movement. Once they become part of the movement, women find a community in 
which they can find friends and marriage candidates. Some become very active propagandists 
for the jihadist cause (AIVD, 2017).13 These characteristics also emerge from our case study. 
For example, several Islamic marriages took place between radical young men from the youth 
group and women connected to the sister network in the Netherlands. Mario, Björn, and 
Ahmed married before 2013. The woman that married Ahmed met him through Björn, whose 
wife she knew. A sister of Hassan and Sahir married a radicalised young man connected to a 
youth group in another part of the country. Ahmed’s widow married another jihadist and 
finally, in 2015, Rachid married a woman who had tried to travel to Syria from another part of 
the country. No firm conclusions on the role of women can be drawn from this case study, but 
given that the sister network has been active for a number of years (Groen & Kranenberg 
 
12 Although journalists Groen & Kranenberg (2006) published a book on the women related to the Hofstad 
network, which included the jihadist that killed filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.  
13 Manrique et al, (2016) showed with Social Network Analysis that women in US extremist networks may play 
a role in connecting subgroups and thereby consolidate the movement.  
  
 
 
 
 
Neve, Weerman, Eris & van Prooijen: Radicalisation and travelling to Syria among 
delinquent youths 
 
 
 
 
271 
Spring 2020 
Nr. 22 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
already mentioned their Islamic fashion shows in 2006), further research in its role in the 
jihadist movement seems warranted.14  
It was mentioned in the interviews several times that ‘recruiters’ were allegedly active 
in N1, especially around the mosques. Although Yusuf clearly had intensive contact with 
members of the Salafi-jihadist network in the Netherlands, a specific role as a ‘recruiter’ was 
never proven. Respondents maintain that there must have been recruiters active in N1, 
although there was no concrete evidence against specific people. The only indication that 
recruiters had been active was that young people who stayed when others travelled to Syria 
received anonymous phone calls, asking them to come too. Most likely, the recruiters were in 
fact the group around Ahmed and Mohamad, the first travellers to Syria that connected to the 
jihadist network through friends such as Mario.  
 
Trigger events and religious development 
Trigger events played an important role for the first group of travellers around Ahmed 
and Mohamad. When their father died in 2009, the eldest son took over his role in the family. 
Soon he turned to religion and in the process became convinced that the sermons of the local 
imam were deviating from ‘true’ Islam. An even more important trigger event for this first 
group of travellers was the failed armed robbery in 2010 in which a friend died. After this 
event, the brothers focused more on religion and gave up behaviours they considered 
incompatible with it, such as smoking cannabis.15 From that moment onwards, the group of 
friends started wearing djellaba’s on the street. These observations are in line with findings 
from previous research that death and the confrontation with one’s own mortality can be a 
trigger factor for radicalisation (Feddes et al., 2015; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & 
Orehek, 2009; Thijs et al., 2018).  
 
14 This would build on Van San (2018) who studied the motivation of women who travelled to Syria by 
interviewing family members directly and the women themselves through internet.  
15 The possibility that the brothers used the death of the friend consciously to involve others in their already 
ongoing radicalisation process was not confirmed by interviewees.  
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The two brothers and a handful of friends, all involved in the youth group, turned their 
back on the regular mosque and started meeting together in other places, first within the 
mosque building. When they were turned away by mosque elders, they started gathering in 
other places and finally found refuge in a mosque that a jihadist preacher and his friends had 
taken over, in a nearby town. They became acquainted with Mario, although it is unclear 
whether this was before or during the episode in 2011/2012 that they regularly met this 
preacher. The core group grew to about ten, mostly in their early twenties. 
  More generally, all Syria travellers seem to have gone through religious change before 
2013, although the degree to which this was the case varied. In particular the group around 
Ahmed and Mohamad searched for a more strict and radical form of Islam, which they finally 
found with the jihadist preacher who later left for Syria too. But also the more criminal 
travellers, who committed crimes even shortly before leaving for Syria, had started praying 
and visiting mosques in the months preceding departure. However, they were not involved 
with the group visiting the jihadist preacher. 
The first group of travellers (in particular Mohamad and Ahmed) was peripheral to the 
criminal part of the youth group, but seemed to acquire status and credibility because of their 
alleged ‘knowledge of Islam’ and their connections with the jihadist network in the larger 
region. People related to this network had become notorious for their provocative actions that 
attracted media attention. It seems likely that the more criminal group members that left for 
Syria later on were also inspired by the status of the first group’s knowledge and connections 
than by the radical religion per se.16 The fact that returnees were often seen surrounded by 
younger group members, who seemed to admire them, supports this idea.  
 
Response of the direct environment 
Whereas the municipality and the police were completely taken by surprise when 
twenty people from the neighbourhood left for Syria in early 2013, some families and 
 
16 See Ilan and Sandberg (2019) for a discussion of ‘street capital’ that can be ‘earned’ through jihadist as well as 
criminal connections. 
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neighbours did observe already that something was going on. Some families tried to reach out 
to the social work sector, the municipality authorities or the police with signals that something 
was going wrong. According to the interviewees, a lack of knowledge and experience was the 
reason that very little happened with these signals. For example, when one of the group 
members died in a robbery, there were signals that existential questions emerged among some 
group members, but no one knew how to deal with them, including social workers, the imam, 
and elders of the local mosque. A lack of motivation to do something may have played a role 
as well: these youths were seen as criminals who deserved little compassion, according to 
some of the professionals involved. When the radical group became a real nuisance to the 
local mosques, police officers still felt unable to intervene, as no law was broken directly. 
Further, in the early months of 2013, agencies that were involved in the troublesome youth 
group in N1 were unable to share information and to collaborate in their reaction when it 
became clear that several youths had radicalised and travelled to Syria. One teacher noticed 
the radicalisation of a few of his students, but had no idea how to respond. 
Since 2013, the cooperation between agencies has improved, as is most clearly 
expressed in the new ‘person-oriented approach’. People exhibiting signs of radicalisation are 
discussed in case consultation meetings. More generally, agencies involved in these meetings, 
such as the municipal authority, youth care, social work and the police try to facilitate a 
normal life for an individual. That is, they exchange information on the developments with 
respect to housing, schooling, jobs, relationships and childcare. Interventions are directed at 
influencing these aspects of life rather than deradicalisation per se. 
 
Development of the group as a whole 
Ultimately, only a small number of all the people involved in the troublesome youth 
group (mostly young males) joined the radical subgroup that left for Syria, with some of them 
returning. Some of those involved in the radical subgroup remained criminally active until 
shortly before travelling to Syria, but most of the initial travellers were not serious criminals 
and had only minor or older offences in their criminal records. They belonged to the youth 
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group in a more social way; they were part of the street culture. According to our 
interviewees, many of the other members of the youth group took some distance from the 
radical group when the radicalisation process became serious. Some youth group members 
also kept their distance when travellers returned and in some cases resumed their criminal 
careers. On the other hand, they all continued seeing each other in N1. Some of the radical 
subgroup members finally found a job or started a business, whereas others developed a more 
serious criminal career. Some people involved in the group remained interested in Islam and 
went on a pilgrimage with Hamza and others in 2019. 
As travelling to Syria and the preceding radicalisation coincided with the presence of 
crime in the youth group, the case of N1 can be seen as an example of the ‘new crime-terror 
nexus’. However, there seemed to be no direct path from earlier crime to radicalisation, and 
most of the travellers belonged to the less criminal part of the group. Some committed crimes 
just before leaving whereas others had long ago given up crime or had never been involved in 
it. Although several members of the youth group had been incarcerated in the years preceding 
departure, we found no evidence that anyone became radicalised in prison. There have been 
signals suggesting that returnees committed crimes in order to finance jihad, but such charges 
were cleared in court and prosecutors appeared to be convinced that the suspects were 
primarily motivated by financial gain.  
 
Radicalisation in other troublesome youth groups in the Netherlands 
In our inventory to find signs of radicalisation in other troublesome youth groups 
known to the Dutch authorities, we found 360 hits on an individual level within a database of 
4691 individuals connected to 479 youth groups. ‘Hits’ imply that a person is present in one 
or more records of radicalisation and terrorism, ranging from a single contact with a known 
suspect to involvement in terrorist activities and travelling to Syria. Therefore, we scrutinised 
these data carefully and considered whether there were any indications that radicalisation was 
also substantially prevalent in the troublesome youth groups to which the individuals 
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belonged. For thirty youth groups (out of 144 with at least one hit) we found that there were 
five or more members with records in the radicalisation and terrorism database. For these 
groups, the local police were contacted in order to acquire more information about the 
radicalisation in the youth groups they had been in contact with. In the end, it appeared that 
there were only four youth groups where radicalisation was serious and connected in some 
way to the group as a whole. This leads us to conclude that radicalisation and travelling to 
Syria are relatively rare in troublesome youth groups the Netherlands. 
All four groups selected from the inventory were active in deprived neighbourhoods, 
mostly older working-class areas in which the population had become ethnically diverse in 
recent decades. This aspect differs from N1, which is a 1970s flats area mostly. Other 
neighbourhood characteristics were quite similar, such as high levels of poverty and 
unemployment and low schooling. As in N1, young people complain about discrimination and 
not being allowed to take part in society.  
The interviews with professionals connected to the four other youth groups suggested 
that the radicalisation process in these youth groups was less intense than in our case study, 
and we found only one group that included travellers. In all these groups, persons with longer 
lasting ties to the jihadist networks were around and made contact with some young people. 
However, merging of part of the group with the jihadist network was seen only in the group 
from which young men had travelled to Syria. Some professionals we interviewed observed 
that youths from the four groups believed that many crimes were not really serious if their 
victims were kafirs, unbelievers. Further, it appeared that conspiracy theories such as about 
the Illuminati are rather popular among youth group members. Although this has been linked 
to further radicalisation in previous literature (e.g. Bartlett & Miller, 2010), the professionals 
we interviewed did not observe any serious consequences of these beliefs. 
For two groups, interviewees noted that members had developed a renewed interest in 
Islam, the religion of most of their parents. They visited several mosques and preachers in 
their search and professionals worried that they might fall in the hands of recruiters, but find it 
difficult to enhance the resilience of young people in this respect. In our core case study, 
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specific events played a role in religious and ideological development, while this appeared to 
be less the case in the four other groups.  
In the two comparison groups with no signs of radicalisation, no people with 
connections to jihadist networks were identified, and no visiting of radical mosques or radical 
preachers was observed. Other circumstances and characteristics of the group and its 
involvement in crime were similar. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
The events leading to radicalisation travelling to Syria in the troublesome youth group in N1 
appeared to be relatively unique, since no other youth group with comparable developments 
was found in the Netherlands. Risk factors for increased susceptibility to radicalisation are 
present in many deprived neighbourhoods in the Netherlands, whereas actual travelling to 
Syria took place in only a few. In our central case study and in the four other groups with 
signs of radicalisation, people with longer lasting ties with the jihadist movement had a 
connection to some group members. In our case study, the presence of converts17 as well as 
young women with connections with the jihadist network has had a catalyst effect on 
radicalisation in the youth group. Thus, it seems that the onset of radicalisation takes place 
through network contacts. We also found in our case study that particular trigger events 
played a role in the religious development of members of the youth group. Internal group 
dynamics and street culture added to the attractiveness of travelling, while authorities and 
youth workers seemed to have lost contact with the group and government institutions did not 
have a satisfactory response to the radicalisation process within the group.  
With respect to the six possible scenarios for the link between troublesome youth 
groups and radicalisation that we formulated at the outset, we conclude that the third fits our 
results best: there was a subgroup within the youth group that radicalised and merged with a 
 
17 See Van San, 2015b on Belgian and Dutch converts who joined the jihadist movement.  
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larger jihadist network. Scenario six, largely congruent with Pyrooz et al.’s 
‘interchangeability model’, fits to some extent. The backgrounds of radicalised and criminal 
youths in our study are quite similar, and some have in fact moved from crime to 
radicalisation and back again. However, several others have moved away from crime and 
taken up a Salafist lifestyle. 
The presence of the youth group seems to have strengthened the radicalisation process, 
as it provided an infrastructure in which ideas could be dispersed easily. Rewards in terms of 
status and prestige also seemed to have played a role. Many travellers come from 
neighbourhoods with a concentration of young people with migrant backgrounds, in which 
poor schooling and housing, unemployment and discrimination lead to a criminogenic street 
culture where young people turn their back on society. Here, becoming someone, or the ‘quest 
for significance’ (Kruglanski et al., 2013), can be achieved through crime, but knowledge of 
jihadist ideology and connections in the wider jihadist network seem to offer an alternative.  
With respect to the ‘crime-terror nexus’ in youth groups, it can be concluded that the 
connection between crime and radicalisation is not straightforward or linear. On the contrary, 
only a minority of the criminal part of the youth group radicalised, and they were less 
criminal than most other members of the youth group. Although some of the more criminal 
travellers returned quickly, they were not the only ones. Among those who fought in Syria, 
some were criminals even on the eve of their departure, or when they already visited 
preachers’ gatherings.  
Basra et al. suggested that the radical ideology can bring legitimation as well as 
redemption to criminal youth. The redemption aspect was reflected in the focus on religion 
after the trigger events that led to the first group of radicalising youth. The legitimation aspect 
was found among youths stating that crime with kafirs as victims could not be that bad. The 
concept of the unbeliever (kafir) is sometimes extended to mainstream Muslims who do not 
adhere to radical Islam (takfir). This was also found in other youth groups, and social workers 
have concerns that this might be a forerunner of radicalisation.  
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Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
Because of the focus on troublesome youth groups, a considerable amount of the 
(former and present) criminality among jihadists was beyond the scope of this study. Many 
foreign fighters have criminal records, without being a member of a youth group. In order to 
fully understand the crime-terror nexus, data should be gathered for a larger and 
representative group of individual jihadists and Syria travellers in order to get a more 
complete image. Reconstructing their ‘story-lines’, as recommended by Agnew (2006), which 
closely resembles the approach in the present study, would importantly add to our insights in 
the crime-terror nexus.  
Another consequence of the focus on youth groups is that we cannot explain the 
concentration of travelling from certain neighbourhoods in the Netherlands. In several 
neighbourhoods from which much jihadist travelling to Syria occurred, no strong connection 
was found to the local youth groups. This suggests that future research might also consist of 
case studies with clusters of travellers as the unit of investigation. The overlap of the 
troublesome youth group with the jihadist network seems to be a special case rather than an 
explanatory factor. 
At the time of the study, some criminal investigations were still ongoing, which meant 
that we were unable to conduct any interviews with returnees and young people related to the 
radical group. It would be worthwhile to attempt conducting such interviews in this and other 
neighbourhoods at a later stage.  
Finally, the role of young women became apparent in the course of the study, 
supporting the idea that they may play an important role in the consolidation of the jihadist 
movement by connecting different sections with their own sister network and through Islamic 
marriages with male jihadists. Data available to this study focused strongly on the criminal 
behaviour of youth groups, leading to a ‘male’ bias. Our findings suggest that further study on 
the sister network could lead to insights that can help in countering jihadism. 
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Lessons from this study  
The youth groups we studied are all active in neighbourhoods that are often seen as a 
breeding ground for radicalisation since risk or ‘susceptibility’ factors known from the 
literature abound: poor housing conditions and high levels of child raising problems, 
concentrations of young people with bleak future prospects who experience discrimination, 
and a feeling of not being allowed to take part in society. People with earlier connections with 
the jihadist network were present in these neighbourhoods. In the core case study in 
neighbourhood ‘N1’, trigger events played an important role in the development of a radical 
group that was able to influence a number of others, finally leading to a large number of Syria 
travellers.  
A striking finding is that the direct social environment of the radicalising youth 
seemed to remain passive, apparently seeing no options for action, although some noticed 
signs that something was going on with their friend, brother or son. Parents, teachers and 
people involved in the mosques showed a reluctance to act, partly because they did not know 
how to do so, and partly because they feared unintended consequences.18  
Although this study concerns travelling to Syria, possible strategies for prevention that 
follow from our findings may be relevant for radicalisation into violent jihadism in a broader 
sense. Such radicalisation may occur in connection with international developments, such as 
new jihadist hotspots after Syria, as well as more local developments, such as tensions in 
society related to the rise of populism and extreme anti-muslim political movements. First, it 
seems to be key to keep in contact with youths that are at risk and give them the feeling that 
they belong to society. In our core case study, we observed repressive police action and 
restrictions on admission to the youth centre, which led to loss of contact with the youth 
group. Alternative methods to maintain contact, such as outreach youth work or ‘street corner 
work’, might have led to an earlier insight into the development of a radical group. Second, it 
appears to be important to offer psychological support for youth at risk who experience 
 
18 The Dutch word ‘handelingsverlegenheid’, literally ‘embarrassment to act’ was used in several interviews.  
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dramatic events. In our case, when a member of the group died in a failed robbery, his friends 
clearly developed existential questions after their confrontation with death and dying, that 
were not answered by the local mosque or by other professionals. The group turned to a 
nearby jihadist preacher, which eventually seems to have contributed to their travels to Syria. 
Finally, it is important to provide alternatives for jihadist and other extremist networks that 
may come into contact with or even reach out to youths at risk. The presence in 
neighbourhoods of people involved in a larger jihadi network seems to have been an 
important factor in the development of radicalisation. Although this was partly known to the 
authorities, it proved difficult to intervene. Preventing potentially radicalising people from 
having contact with youth in a neighbourhood is often difficult from a legal point of view. 
Apart from promoting resilience among young people at risk, a possibility worth developing 
further could be to arrange alternatives for young people, for instance by engaging positive 
role models such as rappers, and by training imams able not only to reach them, but also to 
keep them on a moderate and non-violent path.   
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